Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 95

Issue 3

Article 6

2007

Reviving Lazarus: Status of the FDA Compliance Defense after
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences and the New FDA Regulations
Jason T. Ams
University of Kentucky

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Food and Drug Law Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Ams, Jason T. (2007) "Reviving Lazarus: Status of the FDA Compliance Defense after Bates v. Dow
Agrosciences and the New FDA Regulations," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 95: Iss. 3, Article 6.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol95/iss3/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

NOTES

Reviving Lazarus: Status of the FDA Compliance
Defense after Bates v. Dow Agrosciences and the New
FDA Regulations
Jason T Ams'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Pharmaceutical products liability cases continue to flow into courtrooms
across the United States, burdening both the courts and the pharmaceutical industry! The industrial impact of this litigation is readily apparent.
For instance, pharmaceutical giant Merck announced that it will close five
manufacturing plants and lay off 7,000 employees, 3 over a tenth of its workforce, due in part to thousands of lawsuits over Vioxx.4 Further, Merck will
have to cope with the exponential cost of litigation and divert resources
away from valuable medical research projects. These effects, combined
with a simultaneous call by various consumer advocacy groups to lower the
cost of medications,' have caused the major pharmaceutical companies to
search for ways to remove themselves from costly litigation.
Pharmaceutical products liability cases based on manufacturing or design defects are few; instead, the vast majority of the cases center upon
the "failure to warn" theory.6 Attorneys for the pharmaceutical companies,
and notably for the company Pfizer, have attempted to combat "failure to
warn" claims with a federal preemption defense, sometimes referred to as
the "FDA compliance" defense. 7 The theory is based on federal preemption of tort claims through compliance with Food and Drug Administration ("FDA') regulations or by FDA declarations on the issue. Historically,
courts refused to recognize the defense. Two key events have occurred,
however, that inject new life into the issue and bring the "FDA compliI J.D. Candidate, 2007, University of Kentucky College of Law; B.S. Political Science,
2004, Murray State University.

2 Diane E. Lifton & Michelle M. Bufano, A Callfor Continued State Law Tort Reform,
PHARMACEUTICAL & MED. DEVICE L. BULL., Mar. 2oo4, at I.
3 Alex Berenson, Revamping at Merrk to Cut Costs, N.Y. "IMES, Nov. 29, 2005, at CI.
4 Id.

5 Id.
6 Lifton & Bufano, supra note 2, at I.
7 Id.
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ance" defense to the forefront of pharmaceutical "failure to warn" products
liability cases.
First, the FDA filed an amicus curiae brief in Motus v. Pfizer, Inc. 8 that
supported federal preemption of a state tort claim. The brief stated that the
FDA had previously considered the warnings insisted upon by the plaintiff
in their "failure to warn" claim and rejected them. 9 Had Pfizer added the
warnings to the FDA-approved warnings, the company would have been
subject to misbranding provisions under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics
Act ("FDCA"), 0 the governing organic statute of the FDA and its prescription drug labeling efforts.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the summary judgment
dismissing the suit in favor of Pfizer, but it did not reach the issue of preemption." Two subsequent cases utilized the Motus brief to find federal
preemption of the state "failure to warn" claims, but several other courts
refused to follow suit. Following the U.S. Supreme Court case of Bates v.
Dow Agrosciences, LLC,12 it seemed that although FDA regulatory warnings
alone would not allow for preemption, state tort liability might be preempted when something more (such as the Motus brief) was both present
and timely.13 Before this theory could be tested further, however, the FDA
upped the ante.
The second event occurred when the FDA announced a new regulatory system for prescription drug warning labels on January 24, 2006. The
purpose of the new regulations was to greatly simplify the existing labels
by adding a "Highlights" section for major indications, effects, and directions, along with several other alterations. During promulgation of this rule,
"some manufacturers expressed concerns that, by highlighting selected information ... to the exclusion of information not highlighted, they make
4
themselves more vulnerable to product liability claims."'
The FDA responded to these criticisms by "tak[ing] steps to enhance
the prominence of the Highlights limitation statement."' While believing
"that this limitation statement will help to ensure that the labeling will be
considered in its entirety in any products liability action," the FDA also

8 Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 358 F3d 659 (9th Cir. 2004).
9 Amicus Brief for the United States in Support of the Defendant-Appellee and CrossAppellant, Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 358 E3d 659 (9th Cir. 2004) (Nos. 02-55372, 02-55498), 2002
WL 32303084.
io Amicus Brief for the United States, supra note 9, at 15;see also 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-99
(2oo0).
11 MOus, 358

12 Bates v.

F3d 659.

Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 544 U.S. 431

(2005).

13 Id. at 452-53.
14 Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and
Biological Products, 21 CF. R. § 201.56.
15 Id. at 3933.
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declared that it believed "that under existing preemption principles such
product liability claims would be preempted." 16 The FDA has maintained
that this is simply a statement of its long-held policy, and many groups
have asserted that the preemption assertion appears in the preamble to
the actual rule, thus holding no legal force.' 7 Both sides of the issue are still
highly concerned. The pharmaceutical industry feels they are being made
vulnerable to increased litigation despite the FDA's assurances; conversely,
plaintiffs' lawyers, consumer advocacy groups, and legislators alternate between asserting that the FDA lacks the power to make such assurances
and accusing the FDA of stripping prescription drug recipients of essential
rights.
The following Note analyzes whether the FDA regulations actually
preempt state tort law. Part II provides a brief overview of the technical requirements for compliance with the FDA warnings requirements.1 8 Part III
examines the history of preemption through compliance with the FDCA,
both in general and in connection with the Motus brief. 9 Part IV examines the impact of the recent United States Supreme Court case of Bates v.
Dow Agrosciences, LLC on pharmaceutical products liability "failure to warn"
cases as applied in Rite Aid Corp. v. Levy-Gray. 0 Finally, Part V compares the
conclusions of law leading up to the recent FDA assertion and the impact
of the statements by the FDA on the status of the law."'
II.

TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR

FDA

APPROVAL

For a drug to be approved by the FDA, it must be shown that the "drug
is safe for use and ... such drug is effective in use. '"22 The pharmaceutical
company demonstrates this requirement through a "new drug application"
("NDA") that contains "all of the animal, pharmacologic, and clinical studies and evaluations pertinent to the safety and efficacy of the drug." 3 While
a detailed list of the numerous requirements for FDA approval is beyond
the scope of this Note, the process has been defined as a "unique" one,
"required by law before a prescription drug can be marketed, [including]
16 Id.
17 Senate DemocratsMay Block FDA Rx Labeling Rule with Legislation, FDA WEEK, Jan. 20,
zoo6, 2006 WLNR 1097774.
18 See infra notes 22-31 and accompanying text.
19 See infra accompanying notes 32-99 and accompanying text.
2o Rite-Aid Corp. v. Levy-Gray, 876 A.2d i i 5 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005), affd, 894 A.2d
563 (Md. 2oo6); see also infra notes ioo-i6. and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 117-48 and accompanying text.
22 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A) (2000).
23 Wilfred P. Coronato & Stephen Lanza, The Fracturethat Will Not Heal: the Landscape
of Federal Preemption in the Fields of Medical Devices, Prescriptionand Over-The-Counter Drugs
Ten Years after Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, SLo38 ALI-ABA 365, 383 (2005) (citing 21 U.S.C.A. §
355(b) & (d) (West 2006)).
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the FDA's continued involvement in evaluating product labeling during
'' 4
the post-marketing phase."
The post-marketing phase is typically the time period involved in litigation, and it usually centers on some side effect that has surfaced and injured a plaintiff after initial marketing but before the labeling on the drug
has been changed. The regulations for updating a warning label require an
applicant to "notify the FDA about each change in condition established
in an approved [NDA] beyond the variations already provided for in the
[NDA]." 2 A specific set of "changes" to the warning label are designated
as "major changes" and must be sent to the FDA as a supplemental submission for approval before the manufacturer may employ them on the
packaging.2 6 These mandatory submissions are not required for "changes
in labeling [that] ... add or strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution, or adverse reaction." 7 On their face, the regulations do not appear to
support a federal preemption defense as they specifically allow additional
warnings to be included in the warnings package by the manufacturer.
Notwithstanding this language, pharmaceutical companies continued
to attempt a preemption defense, citing the broad and inclusive role of
the FDA in authorizing new drugs, the continued surveillance and reporting requirements concerning existing drugs, and the ability of the FDA
to force withdrawal of the drug accompanied by possible criminal and/or
civil penalties when either new information arose concerning the drug's
8
properties or the drug was mislabeled in violation of the FDA mandate.1
Due to this heavy regulation, the companies claimed, a state court plaintiff
commencing a "failure to warn" claim would meet the requirements for
conflict preemption and be barred by the applicable federal law. Courts
strongly resisted this defense in general, and they almost universally denied a general "preemption" defense for warning labels under the FDCA. 9
The successes were rare and often accompanied by other, more established
grounds for the ruling.30 New life, however, was breathed into the issue by
a FDA amicus curiae brief in Motus v. Pfizer,Inc.31

Lifton & Bufano, supra note 2, at i.
C.ER. § 314.7o(a)(I) (2oo6).
26 21 C.F.R. § 314.7o(b)(i) (2oo6).
27 21 C.F.R. § 314.7o(c)(6)(iii)(A) (2oo6).
28 Lifton & Bufano, supra note 2, at 2.
29 Coronato & Lanza, supra note 23, at 384.
30 See, e.g., Ehlis v. Shire Richwood, Inc., 233 E Supp. 2d 1189 (D.N.D. zoo2), aff'd, 367
E3d 1013 (8th Cir. 2004).
31 Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 358 F3d 659 (9th Cir. 2004); Amicus Brief for the United States,
24

25 21

supra note 9.
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III.

THE MOTUS BRIEF AND THE AFTERMATH

A. Previous PreemptionEfforts
Prior to the Motus case, few courts found state pharmaceutical products
liability claims preempted by FDA regulations promulgated under the
FDCA. An example of one of the rare cases that allowed preemption was
Ehlis v. Shire Richwood, Inc.3" The pharmaceutical companies involved set
forth all forms of preemptive arguments, including express preemption and
every form of implied preemption. The court concentrated on the ability
of a pharmaceutical company to only temporarily alter the warning until
the FDA could review and approve the change. It also noted the extensive
review of Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr"3 and preemption law conducted by the
a similar situation
Eighth Circuit in Brooks v. Howmedica, Inc.3 concerning
3
under the Medical Device Amendments ("MDA"). 1
Ultimately, the district court concluded that the plaintiff failed to distinguish the MDA from the FDCA and "[was] not con vinced that preemption
would not apply in this case."36 This ruling was in the alternative to other,
more accepted arguments, and it did not lead to more preemption findings
in that jurisdiction. It was later affirmed on the more accepted argument
of the "learned intermediary rule," and the appellate court declined to address the preemption issue.37
The Motus case, although not resolved on the federal preemption issue,
awakened a new theory for the defense in 2000. The FDA directly intervened in the Motus case by filing an amicus brief declaring that the warning promulgated by the plaintiff would have "misbranded" the drug had
it been applied to warnings included for Zoloft.35 The same amicus brief
32 EhAlis, 233 F. Supp. 2d i189.

33 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).Medtronic is a principal federal preemption
case that addressed potential federal preemption concerns over medical devices under
the Medical Device Amendments ("MDA"). The court ruled against preemption, finding
that state actions that were substantially equivalent to the federal requirements were not
preempted and instead simply gave an alternative for litigants to pursue. Specifically, the
court held that the federal government's requirements in the MDA were too "generic" in
nature to be preemptive, "quite unlike a case in which the Federal Government has weighed
the competing interests relevant to the particular requirement in question, reached an
unambiguous conclusion about how those competing considerations should be resolved in
a particular case or set of cases, and implemented that conclusion via a specific mandate on
manufacturers or producers." Id. at 501. The Medtronic case is one of several that contribute to
the current shape of federal preemption law, and an extended discussion of all its points and
conclusions is beyond the scope of this Note.
34 Brooks v. Howmedica, Inc., 273 F3d 785 (8th Cir. 2oo1).
35 Id. at 791.
36 Ehlis, 233 E Supp. 2d at 1198.
37 Ehlis v. Shire Richwood, Inc., 367 E3d 1013, 1015, io

9

(8th Cir. 2004).

38 Amicus Brief for the United States, supra note 9, at 15-22.
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was used successfully in Dusek v. Pfizer,Inc.39 later in 2000 and Needleman v.
Pfizer,Inc.' in 2002. The brief was disregarded by courts beginning later in
2002 and continuing through 2005.
B. Motus v. Pfizer, Inc. andDirectIntervention by the FDA
Plaintiff Flora Motus brought suit against Pfizer, alleging among other
claims that Pfizer had "negligently ...
fail[ed] to adequately warn the medical community, the general public and plaintiff's decedent, Victor Motus
[husband to Plaintiff] ...of the dangers, contraindications and side effects
...of Zoloft."'41 In particular, Pfizer had failed to warn that use of Zoloft
"can cause the user to become violent and suicidal. ' 4 Shortly after begin43
ning use of Zoloft in November of 1998, Victor Motus committed suicide.
Pfizer sought partial summary judgment on the "failure to warn" claim, and
it based its motion on an amicus curiae brief submitted by the FDA stating that the agency had already considered and rejected such a warning as
unsupported by scientific evidence.'
In its amicus brief, the FDA first stated that "because it had considered
and rejected an additional suicide warning for Zoloft, a state law prescribed
suicide warning would result in misbranding of the drug in violation of federal regulations. '4 The district court believed a company could include its
own warnings with those approved and provided by the FDA. 46 However,
the FDA contested this belief in its amicus brief. The agency stated that
it did not need to specifically disallow any further warnings for preemption to be available." The FDA also argued that the warning requested by
''4
the plaintiff would "frustrate the purposes and objectives of the FDCA. 1
Ultimately, the motion for summary judgment was granted and affirmed
with neither the trial nor appellate court reaching the preemption issue,
but the amicus curiae brief signaled that "the FDA... [would] weigh in on
the preemption argument and ...play a more active role in the disposition

39 Dusek v. Pfizer, Inc., No. Civ.A. H-02-3559, 2004 WL 21918o4, at *4-6 (S.D. Tex. Feb.
20, 2004).

4o Needleman v. Pfizer, Inc., No. Civ.A. 3:o3-CV-3o74-N, 20o4 WL 1773697, at *4 (N.D.
Tex. Aug. 6, 2004).
41 Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 127 E Supp. 2d IO85, io87 (C.D. Cal. 2000), summaryjudgment
granted,196 F.Supp. 2d 984 (C.D. Cal. 2001), affd,358 F3d 659 (9th Cir. 2004).
42

Id.

43
44
45
46
47
48

Id. at io86.
Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 358 E3d 659, 659-60 (9th Cir. 2004).
Coronato & Lanza, supranote 23, at 384.
Id.
Id. at 384-85.
Id. at 385.
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of these cases in the future."49 The FDA was likely unaware, however, that
the Motus brief would live on far past the end of the action itself.
C. Dusek v. Pfizer: Embracingthe Brief
Following the Motus case, Pfizer increased its efforts to use the FDA's brief
to achieve summary judgments on all "failure to warn" claims concerning
Zoloft and the suicide warning. The first case to accept the defense was the
unreported case of Dusek v. Pfizer,Inc. in February of 2004.50 The district
court saw the question in terms of whether the proposed warning by the
plaintiff would be considered " 'false' and 'misleading'" by the FDA." Citing a "unique set of facts" that distinguished the case from prior cases, the
court found that dismissal due to preemption was required."
The Dusek court specifically noted the Motus amicus brief and the positions of the FDA taken therein. After noting that United States Supreme
Court precedent required weight be given to the amicus brief, the court
found support for preemption. 3 Because the amicus brief clearly stated the
FDA's decision that a warning requiring the phrase "Zoloft can and does
cause suicide in some patients" was not supported by scientific evidence
(and application of such would result in misbranding), a state court finding
to the contrary would directly conflict with the FDA power to regulate the
warning and would therefore be preempted.54 The court also stated that
the amicus brief was properly given weight even though there was no express preemption clause contained in the FDCA.55
Finally, the court held that, although the state courts and the plaintiffs might not agree with the FDA's assessment, a products liability action
against the pharmaceutical company was not the proper venue to challenge
their decision. Although previous precedent in Hurley v. Lederle Labs 6 called
for a jury question concerning adequacy of disclosure by the pharmaceutical company to the FDA,57 the Dusek court recognized that the United
49 Id.
50 Dusek v. Pfizer, Inc., No. Civ.A. H-o2-3559, 2004 WL
Feb. 20, 2004).
51 Id. at*3.
52 Id. at *i.

2191804,

at*1,*5-6 (S.D. Tex.

53 See Dusek, 2004 WL 2191804, at *5 (citing Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S.
861, 883 (2ooo)).
54 Id. at *7.
55 Id.
56 Hurley v. Lederle Labs. Div. of Am. Cyanamid Co., 863 F.2d 1173, 1179-80 (5th Cir.
1988).
57 Dusek, 2004 WL 2191804, at *8 (citing Hurley, 863 F.2d at 1179). The court stated,
"assuming that the FDA has processed all the relevant and available information in arriving
at the prescribed warning, its decision as to the proper wording must preempt by implication
that of a state[,] ...[a) factual issue remains ... as to whether the manufacturer provided the

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 95

States Supreme Court had ruled that such "state-law fraud-on-the-FDA'
claims were preempted by the FDCA.18 Such an ability on the plaintiff's
part would cause disclosures to the FDA during the NDA and supplemental phases to become a "deluge of information" and virtually useless to the
FDA. s9
The finding of preemption rested on two key points. First, the Dusek
court specifically addressed the issue of the ability of pharmaceutical companies to strengthen their warnings prior to FDA approval. 6 The key to
bypassing this impediment is the realization that, while the warning could
be supplemented and expanded by the pharmaceutical company, it would
still have to be approved by the FDA at some time. 61 Stating that this later
approval requirement is intended to prevent misbranding by the pharmaceutical company,61the court found that had the plaintiff simply requested
a different form of warning without requiring the causal element between
Zoloft and suicide, 63 then the defense would have been invalid.
The plaintiff, however, insisted upon the specific verbiage causally connecting Zoloft and suicide that the FDA had previously specifically rejected as false and misleading. 6' It was this specific contradiction with a separate declaration by the FDA that completed the preemption. Absent this
specific statement, and contrary to the assertions of the FDA that it need
not specifically disallow a warning for it to be preempted,6' there would
66
have been no conflict preventing the plaintiff from proceeding.
In sum, the Dusek court found that, due to these specific circumstances,
the "FDA's requirements clearly cease to become minimum requirements
and become mandatory. ' 67 Further, the court likened the instant situation
to that of Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. 68 where the United States Supreme Court held that, since Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 208 specifically allowed car manufacturers to choose between seat
belts and/or air bags as required safety devices, an automobile manufacFDA with all the necessary and available information on which to base the warning." Id. at
*8.
58 See id. at *8 (citing Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350
(2ooi)).
59 Id.
60 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
61 Dusek, 2004 WL 2191804, at *9.
62 Id. ("Presumably, this requirement is founded on the principle that the manufacturer
may not unilaterally alter a warning under the claim of 'strengthening' its language when in
fact the change makes it 'false' or 'misleading."').
63 Id. ("Zoloft can and does cause suicide.").
64 Id.
65 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.

66 Dusek, 2004 WL

2191804,

at *9.

67 Id.
68 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co.,

529

U.S. 861,866

(2000).
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turer could not be held liable for choosing not to install an air bag if they
had properly functioning seat belts installed. 69 In Dusek, the FDA had not
merely allowed a choice as in Geierbut had specifically denied the company
from using what the plaintiff claimed was needed. Faced with this special
situation,0 the Dusek court found direct conflict preemption and dismissed
the plaintiff's failure to warn claim.7
Later that same year, the court in Needleman v. Pfizer, Inc. agreed with
the Dusek court on practically the same facts.7" Although the Needleman case
is also unreported, pharmaceutical companies likely hoped that these decisions signaled a trend toward allowing federal preemption in the special
circumstances of Dusek and Needleman. Instead, not only did several subsequent decisions disagree with the Dusek and Needleman courts, but they did
so under remarkably similar circumstances.
D. Cartwright, Zikis, andWitzcak: Disregardingthe Brief
In Cartwrightv. Pfizer, Inc.,7 3 Bethany Cartwright committed suicide following a round of treatment with Zoloft. Cartwright's family claimed that
"Pfizer had sufficient knowledge of the association between Zoloft and acts
of self-harm to warn of this association prior to Bethany Cartwright's death
and yet failed to warn of this association."7 4 Pfizer again claimed preemption by both the FDA's amicus brief from Motus and in general due to the
extensive regulation and control that the FDA asserts over the warnings
on pharmaceutical products. Instead of following Dusek and Needleman, the
Cartwrightcourt found that no preemption existed.75
The Cartwright court found that Congress' primary goal in enacting the
FDCA was "to protect consumers from dangerous products. '7 6 Concern69 Dusek, 2004 WL
70 Dusek, 2004 WL

21918o4,

at *9 (citing Geier, 529 U.S. at 867).

2191804, at

*io.

While the Court is aware that the majority of district courts facing
this issue have declined to find preemption, the facts before this Court
are unique. Unlike the record before the other district courts, the
FDA has made known its position on the preemption issue through an
amicus brief filed with the Ninth Circuit in the Motus appeal, and has
given the causation issue detailed analysis several times .... Thus, this
Court's holding is a narrow one. The Court does not hold that FDA drug
approvals in general preempt failure to warn claims.

Id.
71 Id.
72 Needleman v. Pfizer, Inc., No. Civ.A. 3:03-CV-3074-N, 2004 WL 1773697, at *I (N.D.
Tex. Aug. 6, 2004).
73 Cartwright v. Pfizer, Inc., 369 F Supp. 2d 876 (E.D. Tex. 2005).
74 Id. at 878.
75 Id. at 887.
76 Id. at 882 (citing United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 696 (1948)).
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ing the extensive regulation and control that the FDA normally exercises
over pharmaceutical companies, the court restated that the FDA (and the
FDCA in general) only sets "minimum standards with which manufacturers must comply; they expressly do not prohibit a manufacturer from 'addling
to] or strengthen[ing] a contraindication, warning, precaution, or adverse
reaction.""' The court affirmed that "numerous courts over the years" had
followed this line of thought and even noted that the FDA had adopted
similar thinking in 1965.78 Furthermore, the "minimum standards approach
is ... consistent with Congress' stated intent that the FDCA 'must not
weaken the existing laws', [sic] but on the contrary 'it must strengthen and
extend that law's protection of the consumer."' 79 If preemption was to be
found, special extraneous circumstances would have to be found similar to
Dusek.
The Cartwrightcourt began by examining the same precedent as the
Dusek court in a different light. It noted that the United States Supreme
Court in Geier had "limited its conflict preemption holding to the language
of the federal regulation at question and stated that 'the language of [FMVSS 208] and the contemporaneous [agency] explanation is clear enough
-even without giving [the agency's] own view special weight.' ''8 0 After
noting, as did the Dusek court, that the courts have consistently found no
preemption in these cases over the years, the Cartwrightcourt reaffirmed
Hurley's more general principle that "FDA regulation does not generally
preempt stricter state law standards for medical products.""1 This line of
reasoning helped ensure that more general preemption defenses on phar82
maceutical warning labels would not be successful.
Finally, the court addressed the issue of the amicus brief by the FDA
in Motus. First, it noted the portion of the Motus brief that said the warning
77
78
79
8o
81

Id.
Id.
Id. (citing United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, z8z (1943)).
Id. at 883 (citing Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 86i, 866 (2000)).
Id. at 884 (citing Hurley v. Lederle Labs. Div. of Am. Cyanamid Co., 863 F.zd 1 173,

1179-8o (5th Cir. 1988)).

8z Id. at 886. Pfizer argued that preemption was appropriate due to (a) interference with
the FDA's duty to insure the warnings are scientifically accurate and because (b) the inclusion
of scientifically unsupported warnings would "interfere with the FDA's goal of providing
patients with the benefit of appropriate medications." Id.
Another argument that Pfizer could have tried was that requiring Pfizer to include all
types of warnings prior to FDA approval would result in a "deluge of information" that would
render the warning useless. By following Hurley instead of Buckman Co., Pfizer would not likely
have been successful on this argument even had they made it. The court stated, "[cilearly, the
FDA through its regulations, recognizes its important dual purpose-to provide scientifically
accurate information and to protect consumers-because it allows, and even encourages,
manufacturers to be proactive when learning of new safety information related to their drug."
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would be "in conflict with federal law because there was no (and still is not)
scientific support for such a warning."" The court found that the plaintiffs
had presented evidence to the contrary of the FDA assertions' therefore
showing support for such a warning.85 Second, the plaintiff did not request
a "causal connection" warning between Zoloft and suicide but instead
sought a warning "regarding the association between suicidality and Zoloft
-an association that Pfizer has known about for many years." ' The brief
was therefore no longer arguably a "clear indication" of federal preemption,
and the court ruled against Pfizer on the issue.
Later that year, Cartwright'sholding would be echoed in the cases of Zikis v. Pfizer,Inc.87 and Witczak v. Pfizer,Inc.' The Zikis court, after asserting
that "a court should not find pre-emption too readily in the absence of clear
evidence of a conflict,"89 found the plaintiff could proceed because her proposed warning simply called for an "association between Zoloft and acts of
self-harm." ' Furthermore, the court noted that Pfizer's claims of conflict
preemption were "hypothetical potential conflicts" that might have arisen
had Pfizer properly altered its warning label.9" Pfizer responded by stating
that actual conflicts existed between the FDA and the proposed warning
due to the Motus brief. Finding that Pfizer "fail[ed] to point to evidence
that shows any tangible conflict," the court held that preemption failed because Pfizer was attempting to "artificially construct conflicts where none
actually exist."'" Furthermore, the amicus brief from Motus was nothing
93
more than "legal arguments by counsel" and not precedent.
The Witczak court affirmed the older notion that normal compliance
with FDA regulations establishes a floor, and the ability to unilaterally
strengthen warnings would not allow preemption to be used. The court
also addressed the FDA's amicus brief from Motus and found that a single legal brief from the FDA should not be afforded "preemptive force of

83 Id.
84 Plaintiff presented accumulated evidence that tended to indicate an association
between Zoloft and suicide.
85 Cartwright,369 E Supp. 2d at 884.

86 Id. at 886 n.2.
87 Zikis v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 04 C 8104, 2005 WL 1126909, at *i, (N.D. Ill. May 9, 2oo5).
88 Witczak v. Pfizer, Inc., 377 F. Supp. zd 726 (D. Minn. zoo5).
89 Zikis, 2005 WL 11269o9, at *2 (citing Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861,
866 (zooo)).
9 Id. at *3.
91 Id. at *2.
92

Id. at *3.

93 Id.
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law."' Additionally, the court noted that the FDA had "since modified its
own position" on the connection between suicide and Zoloft.95
By mid-2005, courts were almost universally ruling that the FDA regulations alone would not provide a preemption defense. The specific circumstances surrounding the Motus brief had started strong in favor of preemption, but the theory seemed to be waning, especially in light of the
FDA's reevaluation of the class of drug to which Zoloft belonged. The brief
was outdated, and nothing new from the FDA was ready to fill the gap.
Compounding the problem was a lack of clear indications on how to approach the preemption problem in general.' A complete review and analysis of federal preemption law is far beyond the scope of this Note, but it is
sufficient to say that following the Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr decision and the
confusion surrounding Motus, "[flederal preemption jurisprudence [was]
even less clear ... than in the immediate aftermath of ... Lohr."97 Writers for the American Law Institute and American Bar Association stated in
August 2005 that "one thing remains certain-the debate will rage on until
the Supreme Court steps in and clarifies the doctrine once and for all." 98
Although the doctrine is still far from clarified, the United States Supreme
Court may have aided the pursuit of a solution with the decision reached
in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC.9
IV. BATES v. Dow AGROSCIENcES LLC AND RITE-AID CORP. v. LEvy-GRaY
A. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC: Basic Principles
Ultimately, Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC concerned a statutory scheme
only somewhat analogous to the FDCA, a different set of circumstances
than most "failure to warn" claims in pharmaceutical products liability
litigation, and a clear hesitation to assertively define federal preemption
doctrine. Texas peanut farmers sued Dow Agrosciences for violations of
the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("DTPX') under a variety of
theories. One key issue was whether the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide
and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA") preempted a state tort law claim based
on potential false labeling. While the Supreme Court did not decide the
issue, its instructions to the lower court on remand likely barred the use
of preemption in that case,1" and the dicta on the issue is instructive for
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Witczak v. Pfizer, Inc., 377 E Supp. 2d 726, 730 (D. Minn. 2005).
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Coronato & Lanza, supranote 23, at 384.
Id. at 389.
Id. at 390.

99 Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005).

ioo The case was remanded for further determination.
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projecting how future pharmaceutical products liability preemption claims
will be treated.
The FIFRA regulations governing the claim in Bates involve a misbranding of the product similar to the misbranding provisions of the FDCA,
but there are several key differences. The requirements that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has in place for evaluating the labeling of
products under FIFRA are much less stringent than the FDA's regulations
for prescription drug labeling. For instance, the EPA issued a notice in 1996
that announced it no longer "evaluat[ed] pesticide efficacy for routine label approvals," and it had not done so for over two decades."' This notice
also clearly stated that the "EPA's approval of a pesticide label does not
reflect any determination on the part of the EPA that the pesticide will be
efficacious or will not damage crops or cause other property damage," and
"pesticide producers are aware that they are potentially subject to damage
suits by the user community if their products prove ineffective in actual
use." 102
Further, an express preemption provision was contained in FIFRA,
which stated, "[sluch State [that regulates the sale or use of any federally
registered pesticide or device in the State] shall not impose or continue
in effect any requirement for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under this subchapter."'0 3 The Court held that
preemption would only exist if a rule was for both labeling and packaging
and imposed a requirement in addition to or different from those required
by FIFRA.' ° The Court also found that a rule that motivated an optional
decision would not qualify as a requirement and that while common-law
duties could be considered "requirements," the common-law duties would
have to specifically address labeling or packaging for them to potentially
have preemptive effect. Therefore, a claim based on design defect, manufacturing defect, or express warranty breach would not be affected by such
a preemption provision. 05 It should be noted that a "failure to warn" claim
likely would be affected.
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC provided evidence that allowing common-law suits would provide a "crazy-quilt" of standards, different in every
state, that manufacturers would need to meet in addition to the federal
standards in order to avoid liability. 106 The Court found the issue to be
"exaggerate[d]," and that "no evidence [showed] that such tort suits ...

ioi Bates, 544 U.S. at 44o.
Id. (citing EPA Pesticide Registration Notice 96-4, at 3, 5 (June 3, 1996)).
103 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2ooo).
io4 Bates, 544 U.S. at 444.
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io6 Id. at 448.
102

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 95

[would] create[] any real hardship for the manufacturers or the [regulatory
agencyl." 1 °7
Finally, the Bates Court distinguished the instant case involving herbicides from the decision of Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. 108 involving cigarettes. Cipollone addressed the issue of cigarette package labeling in terms
of recently passed legislation addressing cigarettes specifically instead of
the general provisions of the FDCA. Congress had passed extensive legislation on cigarette packaging, and the state was prevented from deviating
from this legislation. The Bates Court stated:
Private remedies that enforce federal misbranding requirements would
seem to aid, rather than hinder, the functioning of FIFRA. Unlike the cigarette labeling law at issue in Cipollone, which prescribed certain immutable
warning statements, FIFRA contemplates that pesticide labels will evolve
over time, as manufacturers gain more information about their products'
performance in diverse settings .... [Tjort suits can serve as a catalyst in
this process ....
1o
The FDCA more closely resembles FIFRA than it does the tobacco legislation at issue in Cipollone.There are no fixed, immutable warnings for all
of the various pharmaceutical products in the market; instead, it is contemplated that each product is different, and that due to the product being on
the cutting edge of science, the manufacturer's knowledge of the effects of
the drug will change over time as the drug encounters different people in
different environments and different situations.
Because of this instability of the pharmaceutical market, the Bates decision could be read to support the idea that, because the pharmaceutical
manufacturers will be the first ones to gain this knowledge (as opposed
to the FDA or other administrative body), these manufacturers should be
liable in tort for damages caused, as they will be in a better position to
unilaterally strengthen or add to their warnings under the FDCA. Declarations by the FDA, however, might provide the extensiveness (similar to the
tobacco legislation in Cipollone) that would allow preemption. The declaration would also cement the federal requirement with which the "failure to
warn" claim would be conflicting." 0 Ultimately, this simply reinforces the
idea that no preemption should exist in normal pharmaceutical "failure to
warn" tort cases that lack "something extra," like the Motus brief.

107 Id. at 451-52.
io8 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504
109 Bates, 544 U.S. at 451.
i o See supra note 89 and accompanying text.

(1992).
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B. Rite-Aid Corp. v. Levy Gray and Applying the Principlesof Bates
A subsequent decision addressed the implications of Bates in the pharmaceutical context in May 2005." In Rite-Aid Corp. v. Levy-Gray, the court
found Bates to be inapplicable to the instant situation, as it centered on
express warranty."' However, Rite-Aiddid provide at least one court's view
on the preemption defense after Bates. The landscape does not appear to
have changed, and the court determined that preemption was not available
based solely on compliance with FDA regulations. It did not address the
Motus situation.
The Rite-Aidcourt moved swiftly through the normal preemption arguments and found that there was no express preemption provision, thus relegating the defendants to attempt a showing of implied preemption. The
court dismissed implied direct and field preemption, as there was no real
"conflict" in the court's mind between the warning label and the state tort
law (and accompanying suggested warning by the plaintiff); nor was there a
comprehensive regulatory scheme established that provided for exclusive
regulation in light of Supremacy Clause jurisprudence."13 Rite-Aid sought
to rely on implied preemption through obstruction of a federal purpose,
but the court maintained that such preemption was inapplicable as "demonstrated by the many cases upholding state law products liability claims
against pharmaceutical manufacturers whose labels have been FDA approved."" 4
Further, the court noted the Ehlis v. Shire Richwood decision, but it stated that the ruling was not controlling, as Ehlis was ultimately affirmed on
alternative grounds without the appellate court having ever reached the issue of federal preemption. The court also mentioned Needleman and Dusek
in a footnote, but it noted that the underlying rationale from the Motus
brief was never validated, as the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the
claim in Motus without ever having reached the issue of preemption.'1 5 The
court did hold that compliance with the FDA standard would allow for an
inference of product safety, but the inference was clearly rebuttable and did
not extend to the point of preemption. 6
So where did this leave the preemption defense? Although the Rite-Aid
court affirmed the normal "no preemption based on compliance with FDA
regulations" argument, it did not directly apply any of the Bates principles
to a specific and timely Motus situation. It negated the impact of the Motus
i i Rite-Aid Corp. v.Levy-Gray, 876 A.2d i 5 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005), aff'd, 894 A.2d
563 (Md. 2006)
112 Id.at 133.
113 Id.at 130.
114 Id.at131.
115 Id.at 133 n.1o.
i16Id.at 133-34.
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brief by showing the final decision in Motus did not rest on the amicus brief
itself, and it dismissed Needleman and Dusek for the same reason. It did not,
however, adequately address whether the issue of a valid Motus-styled amicus brief would provide federal preemption of a state tort "failure to warn"
claim. Aside from what inferences we can gather from Bates, it appears that
the law was left in the same unresolved state it was in when the Motus case
was originally dismissed.
V. THE FDA's STANCE WITH THE NEW REGULATIONS
AND THE AMICUS OPTION

The FDA issued a new rule on January 18, 2006, that was designed to overhaul the labeling that accompanies prescription drugs for the first time in
twenty-five years." 7 One aim of the new regulation was "to simplify labels
that had become complex legal disclaimers" in response to state tort "failure to warn" actions. " ' Pharmaceutical manufacturers during the promulgation of this rule had become very concerned that the elimination of the
complex warnings would result in increased liability, and the companies
raised these concerns to the FDA during commentary on the proposed
rule. The FDA responded by including language in the preamble to the
rule that stated "an FDA-approved label 'whether it be in the old or new
format, preempts conflicting or contrary state law, regulations, or decisions
of a court of law for purposes of product liability litigation."''' 9 The FDA
addressed the inclusion of the new preamble language in its response commentary when republishing the proposed rules.
First, the FDA emphasized their status as the "expert Federal public health agency charged by Congress with ensuring that drugs are safe
and effective, and that their labeling adequately informs users of the risks
and benefits of the product and is truthful and not misleading."'1 0 It also
stressed the approval procedures required by the FDA for supplementing
warnings, specifically noting and endorsing the Ehlis v. Shire Richwood decision and dismissing decisions that found no federal preemption as a result
of procedures. The FDA stated that although a "manufacturer may, under
FDA regulations, strengthen a labeling warning ... in practice manufacturers typically consult with [the] FDA before doing so to avoid implementing
labeling changes with which the agency ultimately might disagree (and
that therefore might subject the manufacturer to enforcement action)."''
117 Diedtra Henderson, FDA Rule May Aid Drug Firmsin Liability Suits, BOSTON GLOBE,
Jan. 19, zoo6, at D4.
i18 Id.
119 Id.
i2o Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and
Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934 (Jan. 24,2oo6) (codified at 21 C.ER.§ 2o.56).
121 Id.
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Next, the FDA found that "[aInother misunderstanding of the [FDCA]
encouraged by State [sic] law actions is that FDA labeling requirements
represent a minimum safety standard."' 2 The agency dismissed the theory
of state tort law acting as an "appropriate source of supplementary safety
regulations" for prescription drugs, and it found that the FDCA mandated
that its regulations and labeling requirements established both a "floor"
and a "ceiling." ' 3 The "comprehensiveness of FDA regulation[s]" made
"additional requirements for the disclosure of risk information" not necessary for the protection of patients.2 4 The FDA admitted that the act "itself contains no general express pre-emption [sic] provision for drugs," and
even noted that in an amendment to the FDCA in 1962 Congress seemed
to expressly deny preemption," 5 but the FDA maintained that the "exisnot bar
tence of a legislative provision addressing pre-emption [sic]2 does
6
the operation of ordinary principles of implied preemption."
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Id.
Id. at 3934-35-

124 Id. Indeed, the FDA noted the problems that arise when allowing state tort law to
require warnings different from the FDA:

[State law decisions] can erode and disrupt the careful and truthful
representation of benefits and risks that prescribers need to make
appropriate judgments about drug use. Exaggeration of risk could
discourage appropriate use of a beneficial drug ....
State law actions also threaten FDA's statutorily prescribed role
as the expert Federal agency responsible for evaluating and regulating
drugs. State actions are not characterized by centralized expert
evaluation of drug regulatory issues. Instead, they encourage, and in fact
require, lay judges and juries to second-guess the assessment of benefits
versus risks of a specific drug to the general public-the central role
of the FDA--sometimes on behalf of a single individual or group of
individuals. That individualized reevaluation of the benefits and risks
of a product can result in relief-including the threat of significant
damage awards or penalties-that creates pressure on manufacturers to
attempt to add warnings that FDA has neither approved nor found to be
scientifically required. This could encourage manufacturers to propose
'defensive labeling' to avoid State liability,which, if implemented, could
result in scientifically unsubstantiated warning and underutilization of
beneficial treatments.
Id.
12,5 Kefauver-Harris Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962)

provides:
Nothing in the amendments made by this Act to the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act shall be construed as invalidating any provision
of State law which would be valid in the absence of such amendments
unless there is a direct and positive conflict between such amendments
and such provisions of State law.
126 Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug
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The FDA then applied the above assertions and principles to the potential state tort law claims based on prescription drugs. The agency found
six claims that it maintains are preempted by the labeling requirements
that it promulgates under the FDCA:
(1) Claims that a drug sponsor breached an obligation to warn by failing to
put in Highlights or otherwise emphasize any information the substance of
which appears anywhere in the labeling;
(2) Claims that a drug sponsor breached an obligation to warn by failing
to include in an advertisement any information the substance of which appears anywhere in the labeling, in those cases where a drug's sponsor has
used Highlights consistently with FDA draft guidance regarding the "brief
summary" in direct-to-consumer advertising;
(3) Claims that a sponsor breached an obligation to warn by failing to include contraindications or warnings that are not supported by evidence that
meets the standards set forth in this rule, including 201.57(c)(5) (requiring
that contradictions reflect "[kinown hazards and not theoretical possibilities") and (c)(7);
(4) Claims that a drug sponsor breached an obligation to warn by failing to
include a statement in labeling or in advertising, the substance of which had
been proposed to FDA for inclusions in labeling, if that statement was not
required by FDA at the time plaintiff claims the sponsor had an obligation
to warn (unless FDA has made a finding that the sponsor withheld material information relating to the proposed warning before plaintiff claims the
sponsor had the obligation);
(5) Claims that a drug sponsor breached an obligation to warn by failing
to include in labeling or in advertising a statement the substance of which
FDA had prohibited in labeling or advertising; and
(6) Claims that a drug's sponsor breached an obligation to plaintiff by making statements that FDA approved for inclusion in the drug's label (unless
FDA had made a finding that the sponsor withheld material information
relating to the statement).'
The FDA also asserted that the claims would be preempted not only
against manufacturers of the prescription drugs but also against "health

care practitioners for claims related to dissemination of risk information
to patients beyond what is included in the labeling.""1 8 The agency also
recognized not all state law actions would be preempted by the regulations.
For instance, the FDA recognized the Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr decision that
held state law requirements that parallel FDA requirements may not be
preempted.2 9 Finally, the FDA reiterated the Buckman Co. v. Plaintiff's Leand Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg.
Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (zooo)).
127

Id.

IZ8 Id.
129

Id.

3922-01,

3935 n.8 (2oo6) (citing Geier v. Am. Honda
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gal Committee holding that "state-law fraud-on-the-FDA' claims were preempted by Federal law, enforceable only by suits brought by the United
States.13 0
Following these assertions by the FDA, the immediate responses by
the various affected groups varied considerably. Joan Claybrook, president
of Public Citizen, a national non-profit public interest organization, called
the preamble's statements both "a sneak attack on consumer rights" and
illegal, as the FDA does not have the "congressionally mandated authority
to preempt state law."' 31 The National Conference of State Legislatures
(NCSL) also argued that the FDA has "no statutory authority in the FDCA
S.. to preempt state product liability laws as they relate to prescription
drugs."' 32 Further, the NCSL believes that the FDA's prescription drug
regulations only provide a minimum "floor" consistent with a majority of
judicial opinions on the regulations, and it also contends that the regulations violate Executive Order 13132133 and agency law.134 Several democrats
in the United States House of Representatives and Senate denounced the
statements as a "boost to pharmaceutical makers by offering them protection from lawsuits from patients who are injured by their products," and
they maintained that they would seek ways to legislatively block the new
rule before it went into effect on June 30, 2006.135
The FDA itself declined to say that its statements are anything but a
statement of policy. On at least one occasion, it declared that the statements
were nothing more than a reiteration of its long-held policy on preemption, a view that it has stressed in several amicus briefs (including Motus).
Scott Gottlieb, FDA deputy commissioner for medical and scientific affairs,
stated that the "language is in the preamble, not the codified section of the
rule and whether or not individual courts take it into consideration is up to

13o Buckman Co. v. Plaintiff's Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341,348 (zooi).
131 Press Release, Public Citizen, FDA's Drug Label Rule Fails to Guarantee Access
to Vital Information and Includes 'Sneak Attack' on Patients' Legal Rights (Jan. 18, zoo6),
http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/release.cfm?ID=z 114.
132 Press Release, Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, Proposed FDA Rule Preempts
State Product Liability Laws (Jan. 13, 2oo6), http:/lwww.ncsl.org/programs/press/2oo6/
pro6ol 13.htm.
133 Executive Order 13132 requires that the federal government first consult with state
and local governments before finalizing rules that present potential conflict between state
and federal law, which NCSL maintains the FDA did not do in this case. See Exec. Order No.
13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (Aug. 4, 1999); Timothy Ardizzone, Note, The FDA: Advocate or
Regulatorof the PharmaceuticalIndustry? The Attempted Preemption by the FDA of State Tort Claims
for Failure to Warn on Pharmaceutical Labeling,75 U. CIN. L. REv. 763, 783-84 (2oo6).
134 The NCSL maintains that it is a violation of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA)
for the FDA to not reopen its comment procedure to address this issue. See Press Release,
supra note 132. The FDA maintains that it has satisfied the APA on this regard.
135 Senate DemocratsMay Block FDA Rx Labeling Rule with Legislation, FDA WEEK, Jan. 20,
2oo6, 2oo6 WLNR 1097774 [hereinafter Democrats May Block Labeling Rule].
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them."136 The FDA has since extended this "long-held" view to other areas
besides prescription drugs, including over-the-counter medication in spite
of a provision in the FDCA to the contrary.'37
A significant issue has been raised as to the authority commanded by
the statements in the preamble, and a ruling on this issue will obviously
control the shape of the FDA compliance defense. The views of the FDA
differ greatly from the judicial interpretations of nearly every court that has
considered the issue, even the more receptive views of Dusek and Needleman. The FDA cites EhAlis as an example of the "preemption by labeling
only" argument that it makes, but it is interesting to note that nearly every court that has considered the same issue has disregarded the ruling. If
the FDA's opinion has valid legal weight, the federal preemption doctrine
would change drastically.
As the FDA has admitted, however, the language is contained solely
in the preamble instead of the codified section of the rule, and the agency
feels that the final decision as to whether or not preemption actually exists
is to be left up to the individual courts.' 3 As the courts have consistently
rejected the view that the FDA regulations standing alone provide a preemption defense, it is highly unlikely that the most recent statements by
the FDA will have any more impact than the other attempts by the FDA.
Although the preamble statements may influence the courts to lean towards a more favorable view on preemption, the status of federal preemption of state tort law claims will rest with a final resolution between the
principles demonstrated in Dusek and Needleman and the negative cases like
Cartwright,Zikis, and Witczak.
While the current state of an "FDA compliance" preemption defense is
not completely solidified in the eyes of the judiciary, there are several concepts that appear to have reached a general level of consensus. Despite the
FDA's assertions to the contrary, compliance with the FDA labeling provisions alone will not allow a pharmaceutical company to obtain preemption.
While the structure and implementation of the portions of the FDCA concerning drugs are very extensive and thorough, and the FDA has consistently and recently proclaimed the regulations to be preemptive of state
tort law requirements, there does not seem to be enough support either
at the United States Supreme Court or at the lower levels of the judicial
system to overturn this view. Absent the addition of an express preemption
provision similar to that pertaining to medical devices, pharmaceutical drug

136 Id.
137 Bradshaw Says FDA Preempts State Tort Laws on OTC Drugs, FDA WEEK, Feb. 3, zoo6,
2oo6 WLNR 1921073 (citing Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act § 751: "Nothing in this section
shall be construed to modify or otherwise affect any action or the liability of any person under
the product liability law of any State.").
138 DemocratsMay Block Labeling Rule, supranote 135.
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manufacturers will not be able to rely on an approved warning by the FDA
alone.
What is less clear is whether a specific statement by the FDA will be allowed to provide a preemption defense for the pharmaceutical companies.
Cases such as Cartwright, Witczak, and Zikis sought to override the principles of the unreported cases of Dusek and Needleman, and although a vast
majority of other jurisdictions have followed suit, the actual validity of such
a defense has not yet reached the Supreme Court. One reason for the lack
of support for the Motus brief in the later cases, although not mentioned,
could likely have been the span of time between the original filing of the
amicus brief and the date of the rising of the cause of action in each case.
The brief itself was filed in 2000. In Dusek and Needleman, the incidents in
question occurred in early 2000 and 2002. In Cartwright,Witczak, and Zikis,
the incidents occurred in the latter half of 2002, 2003, and 2005, respectively. The plaintiff in Cariwrightaltered its suggested warning to conform
to some of the issues that the Dusek court identified with the preemption
defense, and the court found that the Motus brief was no longer indicative
of the FDA's view because the plaintiff presented evidence that new support for a finding of scientific validity concerning the connection between
Zoloft and suicide had surfaced. This change in circumstances damaged
the credibility of the Motus brief, and the Witczak court noted that the FDA
139
"has since modified its own position" regarding the causal connection.
This view makes sense as more evidence was uncovered linking the type
of drug under which Zoloft was classified with suicide in a variety of situations.
Naturally, the next question is where should the defense go from here?
Following Dusek, several different theories emerged. Diane Lifton, 40 and
4
Michelle Bufano' 41 advocated a complete FDA compliance system 1 simi143
lar to the one codified in Michigan. Lifton and Bufano cited the heavy
regulation by the FDA of the application and post-surveillance process and
that the manufacturer's ability to alter the label was more limited than what
the statutes seemed to imply.'" The recent FDA preamble statements obviously show that the FDA would support Lifton and Bufano's view. Lifton
and Bufano wrote this article prior to Cartwrtight,Zikis, and Witczak, and

139 Witczak v. Pfizer, Inc., 377 F Supp. 2d 726 (D. Minn. 2005).
14o Diane E. Lifton is a Director of Gibbons, Del Deo, Dolan, Griffinger & Vecchione,
PC and co-chair of the Pharmaceutical Medical Devices and Laboratory Practice Group of the
same firm. Lifton & Bufano, supra note 2, at i.
141 Michelle M. Bufano is an Associate at Gibbons, Del Deo, Dolan, Griffinger &
Vecchione, PC and specializes in pharmaceutical and medical device claim defense. Lifton
& Bufano, supranote 2, at i.
142
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§ 6OO.2946(5) (West zoo6).

143 MicH. ComP. LAws. ANN.

144 Lifton & Bufano, supra note
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the reaffirmation of the inability to rely simply on the normal codification
procedures seems to have refuted the possibility of the judicial system approving such a method. While the legislature could remedy the problem
and allow for such an easily obtainable and absolute defense, the general
lack of state legislation on the subject and the repeated refusal by Congress
to add an express preemption clause to the FDCA indicates that this is unlikely. Either a new system would need to be proposed, or a variation on the
preemption idea behind the Motus brief would need to gain support.
Catherine T. Struve, an assistant professor at University of Pennsylvania
Law School, proposed a hybrid qui tam system that would practically allow
the FDA to act as supreme expert witnesses concerning product safety and
causation. 45 Her system would also perform a secondary role as a warning
system for the FDA for products that suddenly incur large amounts of litigation, indicating that an extensive review of that product would be necessary. 146 She recognized that the current post-market surveillance system of
the FDA does not adequately investigate each pharmaceutical product, so
an expert witness function fulfilled by the FDA would allow the agency to
quickly update its knowledge of the product and then render an opinion
that carried the weight of law. In order to fulfill this idea, though, additional legislation would be required, and a fairly extensive "opt in" system
would need to be established. 147 As already noted, legislatures have been
extremely slow to act on this issue, and the reticent nature of Congress on
this subject indicates that while this method may have appeal, the likelihood of its enactment is very slim.
As an alternative to the fully and partially codified systems of Lifton,
Bufano, and Struve, the courts could simply expand on the theories of Dusek
and Needleman. The FDA would file an amicus brief, particularly in situations that involved numerous cases filed on virtually identical claims (like
the Zoloft cases involving Pfizer or the burgeoning Vioxx cases filed against
Merck). This brief, as in Motus, would contain the FDA's view on the current required warning for the drug and whether the plaintiff's proposed
deficiency conflicts with that warning. The FDA has already expressed an
interest in filing amicus briefs in exactly this nature,'48 and while this would
not allow total federal preemption by labeling alone, it would provide the
same kind of liability oversight that the FDA wants to give to the pharmaceutical companies subject to the new regulations. This function would
not require any additional legislation, and as it would not require the FDA
to make a legal ruling (as the qui tam system proposed by Struve would),
it would not place on the FDA a duty with which it is inexperienced. The
145 Catherine T Struve, The FDA and the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance,
YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 587 (2005).
146 Id. at 592-93.
147 Id. at 656.
148 Coronato & Lanza, supranote 23, at 390 n.5.
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FDA has recognized that its regulatory system surrounding the pharmaceutical sector has not been adequate, and it recently overhauled the system in order to make it much more efficient, less prone to error, and less
expensive. With this new system, the FDA will be better able to monitor
the pharmaceutical industry and render accurate, timely briefs for litigation
and advisory purposes. Further, any increase in manpower and surveillance
to give adequate examination to prescription drugs subject to litigation
could be fulfilled by smaller units dedicated to more intensive research as
legal problems concerning the drugs surface.
Ultimately, one of the best supportive reasons for using the modified
amicus brief system would be that it can be implemented now without any
significant changes in legislation or policy. The legal precedent for accepting this style has already been established in Dusek and Needleman, although
it would require a shift in thinking in a majority of jurisdictions. The implementation would be virtually the same as Motus, only with notification
given to the FDA and a request for such a brief to be filed. The decision
would be made during the summary judgment phase, reducing cost and
administrative effort on the part of the FDA and not causing as large a
disruption in the judicial process as the qui tam system would mandate.
The briefs would either be effective for some time, or they would be easily
updated by the FDA when new information arose.
VI. CONCLUSION

The preemption of prescription drug litigation has been a long, heavily
traveled road that has not produced much success for the pharmaceutical
industry. Despite FDA assertions to the contrary, the concept of relying
solely on the regulation of the industry by the FDA for preemption is practically settled and disregarded in all jurisdictions, and only the question of
direct FDA interaction for solely preemptive purposes remains. Although
the qui tam system likely would be effective, the legislation and policy
changes it would require will likely never be met with success, especially
given the attitude devoted to the area as a whole by both state and national
legislatures. The amicus system, as applied in Dusek and Need/eman, should
be applied to allow the FDA to fulfill its statutory duty of ensuring safety in
the industry while eliminating from the judicial system those cases in need
of federal preemption. The courts and the FDA currently have what they
need to begin using this system, and they should start now.

